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ABSTRACT
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in 2005. This implies that many firms engage in trade without directly exporting products. We modify
a heterogeneous firm model so that firms endogenously select their mode of export - either directly
or indirectly through an intermediary. The model predicts that intermediaries will be relatively more
important in markets that are more difficult to penetrate. We provide empirical confirmation for this
prediction, and generate new facts regarding the activity of intermediaries.
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1. Introduction
Research using ￿rm-level data has uncovered that only a fraction of ￿rms export prod-
ucts to foreign markets (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2009). This fact is now well-grounded
in theoretical models featuring ￿rm heterogeneity and ￿xed export costs (e.g., Melitz 2003).
These empirical and theoretical ￿ndings, however, do not account for the activity of in-
termediary ￿rms. The prominence of intermediaries appears in aggregate trade statistics;
in the U.S., wholesale and retail ￿rms account for approximately 11 and 24 percent of ex-
ports and imports (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2009), respectively.1 The use of
intermediary ￿rms has been especially pervasive in developing economies, particularly in
Asia. In the early 1980s, 300 trading (non-manufacturing) Japanese ￿rms accounted for
80 percent of Japanese trade, and the ten largest of these ￿rms accounted for 30 percent
of Japan￿ s GNP (Rossman, 1984). Li and Fung, the 100 year old trading company, is a
prominent example of an intermediary ￿rm that connects clients with thousands of apparel
suppliers in low-wage countries. In China today, the setting of our study, 22 and 18 percent
of total Chinese exports and imports, respectively, are handled by Chinese intermediaries.
The importance of intermediary ￿rms in facilitating trade across borders indicates that
existing models, and empirical works should account for intermediary activity in order to
provide a more complete portrait of a country￿ s imports and exports. In this paper, we
introduce intermediation technology within an otherwise standard heterogenous ￿rm model
of international trade and document their importance using Chinese data that record all
international transactions at the ￿rm level. We demonstrate that intermediaries play an
important role in facilitating trade and their behavior can be rationalized through a simple
and straightfoward extension of the basic heterogenous ￿rm model of international trade
In the model, and as in Melitz (2003), ￿rms can directly export to foreign markets by
incurring ￿xed costs of exports and trade costs. This implies that the least productive
￿rms serve only the domestic market while the most productive ￿rms directly export their
varieties by paying a ￿xed export cost. We additionally allow for intermediation technology
whereby ￿rms can indirectly export their varieties by paying both an intermediary ￿xed
cost, which is smaller than the ￿xed cost of direct exports, and an additional marginal cost.
Analogous to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2006), this new entry margin creates a third type
of ￿rm: an indirect exporter. However, unlike in Helpman et al. (2006), the intermediation
technology here bene￿ts less productive ￿rms. The presence of intermediation technology
provides a mechanism by which ￿rms can access the export market even if they are not
quite productive enough to establish their own distribution network.
This simple extension has important aggregate predictions. The model predicts that the
share of exports handled by intermediary ￿rms increases with variable and ￿xed costs of
1The estimates are conservative since a large fraction of U.S. trade is done by ￿rms with employment in
both production and wholesale/retail (see Bernard et al. 2009).Facilitating Trade 3
exporting and decreases with market size. The reason is that as trade becomes more costly,
￿rms need to possess high levels of productivity to overcome these costs to directly export.
When barriers to trade are large, a larger fraction of less-productive (e.g., small) ￿rms
use intermediaries to export. The share of aggregate exports handled by intermediaries
therefore increases with the di¢ culty of accessing destination markets. This prediction is
consistent with observations from the business literature (e.g., Peng and Ilinitch 1998) and
underpins government policy, such as the 1982 U.S. Export Trading Company Act, which
explicitly encourages the formation of intermediary ￿rms to export on behalf of the ￿tens
of thousands￿of small- and medium-sized U.S. businesses (Export Trading Company Act
of 1982). The model highlights a particular mechanism￿ trade costs￿ that in￿ uences ￿rms￿
decisions to use intermediary ￿rms.
We verify the predictions of the model using a recently constructed database of ￿rm-level
international trade transactions from China. The data reveal several stylized facts about
the behavior of intermediary ￿rms and consequently, China￿ s overall trade patterns. In
2005, Chinese intermediaries accounted for 22 and 18 percent of total exports and imports.
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of intermediaries increased dramatically from about
9,000 to 22,000, suggesting that while the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions on
direct trading right during this period (see discussion below), intermediaries still found it
pro￿table to enter the trading market. Intermediaries￿exports increase with product homo-
geneity which suggests that they ￿aggregate￿orders of relatively homogenous goods across
￿rms. Intermediary ￿rms tend to engage in both importing and exporting and, in stark
contrast to direct exporters, their product mix span remarkably broad sectors. Interest-
ingly, intermediaries appear to have a relative ￿country￿focus while ￿rms that engage in
direct exporting appear to have a relative ￿product￿focus. That is, intermediary ￿rms send
relatively more products per country while direct exporters behave in an opposite manner.
This ￿nding is intuitive; manufacturing ￿rms likely possess a core competent product line
(Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2009), while according to our framework, intermediaries
emerge precisely to overcome the market-speci￿c costs of international trade.
The data are consistent with several predictions from the model; more distant, smaller
countries, and countries that have more regulatory barriers to trade receive a larger fraction
of exports through Chinese intermediaries. Intermediary ￿rms play a relatively smaller role
in exporting to countries that have large Chinese-speaking population which is intuitive
if common language represents a measure of ￿xed exporting costs. Finally, intermediary
￿rms￿export share increases with countries that levy higher tari⁄s on Chinese exports. Our
point estimates imply that increasing a country￿ s distance to China by one log point would
increase the share of exports handled by intermediaries to that country by about 10 percent.
Likewise, an increase in tari⁄s by 10 percentage points (roughly one standard deviation in
our sample) is associated with a 15 percent increase in intermediary export shares.Facilitating Trade 4
The literature suggests two broad explanations to explain why intermediaries arise in an
economy: faciliating matching of buyers and sellers (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987)
and mitigating adverse selection by acting as gauranteers of quality (e.g., Biglaiser 1993
and Spulber 1996). While latter explanation is certainly important, our ￿ndings suggest
that intermediaries, at least in China, arise predominantly due to the former reason. This
is consistent with Rauch and Trindade (2002) who document the importance of ethnic
Chinese networks in facilitating trade. In constrast, Feenstra and Hanson (2004) ￿nd a
quality-sorting role for intermediaries; between 1988-1993, 53 percent of China￿ s exports
were shipped through Hong Kong, and the average markup of Hong Kong re-exports of
Chinese goods was 24 percent. Our evidence more strongly supports the idea that interme-
diaries facilitate trade by helping to overcome trade costs. We observe that intermediaries
are more likely to be present in relatively homogenous goods where quality issues may be
less salient. Furthermore, while we observe that intermediaries export higher unit values
than direct exporters, there is no systematic di⁄erence according to product characteris-
tics. In our framework, intermediaries will export higher unit values because they aggregate
orders from less-e⁄ecient ￿rms and because they charge a markup for their services.
The two papers most closely related to ours are recent work by Felbermayr and Jung
(2009) and Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2009). Felbermayr and Jung (2009) use a similar
theoretical framework and ￿nd that less-productive ￿rms will use intermediary technology,
but they use their model to focus on hold up issues. They also do not predict a systematic re-
lationhip between intermediary exports and country characteristics, which is not consistent
with our empirical ￿ndings. Blum et al. (2009) ￿nd that in the majority of importer-
exporter matches between Colombian and Chilean ￿rms, at least one ￿rm is extremely
large due to search costs, yet do not identify if the large ￿rm is in fact a non-manufacturing
intermediary ￿rm. Their analysis is also restricted to Chilean-Colombian trading partners.
Here, we provide the ￿rst systematic evidence of the characteristics of intermediary ￿rms
and their overall importance in trade for the second largest exporting economy, China,
because we can directly observe the universe of transactions by intermediary and direct
exporters.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the basic model
and the predictions that we will verify in the data. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 presents stylized facts of intermediary ￿rms and veri￿es the predictions from the model.
We conclude in section 5.
2. A Model of Intermediary Firms
In this section, we modify Melitz (2003), in the simplest way possible, to introduce
intermediation technology. We assume that the home country has N asymmetric trading
partners, and we focus on an open economy equilibrium because in autarky there is no roleFacilitating Trade 5
for intermediaries to export.2 We use this model to ￿x ideas and to generate predictions
that we can verify in the data in the subsequent section.
Consumers in each country have identical CES preferences for di⁄erentiated varieties:
U =
￿Z
!2￿j
q(!)￿d!
￿ 1
￿
;
where ￿j is the set of total available varieties in the di⁄erentiated goods sector. The
corresponding price index in each country is given by
Pj =
￿Z
!2￿j
p(!)1￿￿d!
￿ 1
1￿￿
;
where ￿ = 1
1￿￿ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. Each consumer
supplies one unit of labor inelastically and the home wage is set to 1. Total expenditure in
each country is Rj.
The production technology assumes a continuum of heterogenous ￿rms in a monopo-
listically competitive market (Melitz 2003). Each ￿rm manufactures a unit variety with
constant marginal cost and a ￿xed per period overhead cost, fd. The amount of labor
required to produce q units for a ￿rm with productivity level ’ is l = fd +
q
’. Firms enter
the market by paying an entry cost, fe, to draw their productivity from the distribution
g(’). Conditional on its productivity draw ’, a ￿rm has the option to exit the market.
Incumbent ￿rms face an exogenous probability of death in each period.
Conditional on remaining in the market, a ￿rm must decide whether or not to export
and additionally, its mode of export. There are two possible export modes; a ￿rm can
export its varieties to foreign markets either directly or indirectly. As in Melitz (2003), a
￿rm that exports directly pays a per period bilateral ￿xed cost, f
j
x and incurs a standard
bilateral iceberg transportation costs ￿j > 1. The ￿xed cost captures the costs of forming a
distribution and service network in country j. Alternatively, a ￿rm could incur a di⁄erent
pair of transactions costs to export its varieties indirectly using a domestic intermediary
￿rm. We assume that the ￿xed costs of using this intermediation technology are lower than
the exporting ￿xed costs, fi < f
j
x, since presumably the costs of searching for a domestic
￿rm are lower than the costs of an international search. The ￿rm also incurs a variable cost
￿ > 1 to forward its varieties to the intermediary ￿rm.
We assume that the indirect ￿xed costs paid by ￿rms is independent of number of
countries to which these ￿rms export via intermediaries because they re￿ ect the costs of
￿nding and using an intermediary ￿rm in the home country. So once a ￿rm pays the ￿xed
cost of using an intermediary, the ￿rm obtains access to all export markets. One could
interpret the ￿xed cost of intermediation (fi) as the cost of searching and establishing a
2We supress the subscripts for the home country for notational simplicity.Facilitating Trade 6
relationship with a domestic intermediary ￿rm. One interpretation of the variable cost (￿)
is that it captures intermediary ￿rms￿margins.3
Given our assumptions on consumer preferences and market structure, the price is a
constant markup over marginal cost. A ￿rm with productivity ’ in the home market
charges pd(’) = 1
￿’. Firms that directly export to market j charge p
j
x(’) = ￿j
￿’. The price
of varieties that are indirectly exported is p
j
i(’) =
￿j￿
￿’ . Notice that varieties that are
indirectly exported result in a double marginalization.
Firm revenues in the domestic market are given by
rd(’) = RH
￿
pd(’)
PH
￿1￿￿
; (1)
where RH and PH are the home country￿ s expenditure and price index. Additionally, if
￿rms export, their revenues depend on their export mode. The revenues obtained from
market j for indirect and direct export mode, respectively, are
r
j
i(’) = Rj
 
p
j
i(’)
Pj
!1￿￿
(2)
and
rj
x(’) = Rj
 
p
j
x(’)
Pj
!1￿￿
: (3)
The entry costs for each export mode and the revenue conditions in equations (1)-(3)
yield cuto⁄ conditions that induce sorting by ￿rms according to their productivity. The
￿rst cuto⁄ (’d) de￿nes the least productive ￿rm that is active; this ￿rm only sells to the
home country and exactly o⁄sets the ￿xed costs of production with its operating pro￿ts:
￿d(’d) =
rd(’d)
￿
￿ fd = 0: (4)
The second cuto⁄ (’i) is the marginal ￿rm that is just indi⁄erent between exporting indi-
rectly its varieties to all markets:
￿i(’i) = ￿￿1
N X
j=1
Rj(
￿’i
￿j￿
Pj)￿￿1 ￿ fi = 0 (5)
3We could have explicitly introduced symmetric intermediary ￿rms, but this extension would yield qual-
itatively the same predictions as our model. In this case, the intermediaries would equally divide the total
indirect export revenue. A free entry condition would determine the equilibrium number of intermediary
￿rms. The intermediary ￿rms would charge a markup over their price, and this markup would be analogous
to the ￿ parameter. One could also imagine a model with heterogeneous producers matching with hetero-
geneous intermediaries. However, since we only observe the direct exporters and intermediary ￿rms in our
data, we chose not to introduce matching in our framework.Facilitating Trade 7
Equation (5) indicates that there is one cuto⁄in the home country that determines whether
or not ￿rms indirectly export to all markets. All ￿rms with ’ > ’i ￿nd it pro￿table to
incur the indirect ￿xed cost and potentially use the intermediation technology. Once the
indirect ￿xed cost has been paid, a ￿rm then evaluates its net pro￿ts (operating pro￿ts
less ￿xed direct export costs) from directly exporting to market j against the operating
pro￿ts from indirectly exporting to j. If the net pro￿ts from direct export are su¢ ciently
large, the ￿rm chooses to export directly to market j, rather than use the intermediation
technology. Thus, if a ￿rm directly exports to n countries, we assume that the ￿rm ￿nds it
pro￿table to pay the indirect ￿xed cost to serve the remaining N ￿n countries through the
intermediation technology. This assumption enables us to derive a tractable expression for
the total direct and indirect exports to each market below. There are N cuto⁄ conditions
that determine the ￿rms that are indi⁄erent between direct and indirect exports to each
market.
￿x(’j
x) =
r
j
x(’
j
x)
￿
￿ fj
x =
r
j
i(’
j
x)
￿
: (6)
The three entry margins result in a sorting of ￿rms into export modes by productivity.
Firms with ’ < ’i are not productive enough to cover the ￿xed cost of intermediation; these
￿rms serve only the domestic market. All ￿rms that fall in the interval [’i;’
j
x] indirectly
export to market j, and ￿rms with ’ > ’
j
x directly serve market j . Combining equations
(2) and (3) with (6) determines the direct export cuto⁄ to market j:
’j
x =
￿j
￿Pj
"
￿f
j
x
Rj (1 ￿ ￿1￿￿)
# 1
￿￿1
: (7)
Since the indirect export cuto⁄, ’i, which is implicitly de￿ned in equation (5) is common
across destination markets, we can de￿ne the ratio of indirect to direct exports to country
j as:
￿j =
total indirect exports to country j
total direct exports to country j
=
 
Z(’i)
Z(’
j
x)
￿ 1
!
￿ ￿1￿￿; (8)
where Z(a) =
R 1
a ’￿￿1g(’)d’ with Z
0
(a) < 0.
Proposition 1 Assume that each destination market￿ s price index Pj is ￿xed. All else
equal, the share of exports via the intermediation technology will be larger in countries
with (i) smaller market size, (ii) higher variable trade costs, or (iii) higher ￿xed costs of
exporting.
Proof. Di⁄erentiating equation (7), we get (i) @’
j
x=@Rj < 0; (ii) @’
j
x=@￿j > 0; and (iii)
@’
j
x=@f
j
x > 0: Since ’i is common for all trading partners and because Z
0
(a) < 0, we observeFacilitating Trade 8
that @￿j=@’
j
x > 0. Therefore, we conclude that (i) @￿j=@Rj < 0, (ii) @￿j=@￿j > 0, and (iii)
@￿j=@f
j
x > 0:
The proposition states that the share of intermediary exports to market j are related
to market j￿ s characteristics.4 We ￿nd that intermediary export shares will be larger in (i)
smaller countries, (ii) countries that are geographically farther away from the home country,
(iii) markets with higher tari⁄s, or (iv) countries with larger ￿xed export costs.5 These
predictions are intuitive. Unlike Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2006) who introduce foreign
direct investment within a heterogeneous ￿rm framework and ￿nd that the most productive
￿rms choose this mode of ￿selling abroad￿ , in our model, intermediation technology bene￿t
the relatively less productive ￿rms by providing access to export markets. Our model
highlights that intermediaries facilitate trade because they avoid large trade costs.
Bernard et al. (2009) document that only a small fraction of U.S. ￿rms export, a
fact that has emerged across countries. Our model demonstrates that customs-level data
are likely to underestimate the fraction of ￿rms that are globally engaged because less
productive ￿rms can use intermediary ￿rms. For instance, Li and Fung, the large Hong-Kong
based intermediary ￿rm aggregates orders across 12,000 suppliers across the globe, including
China; it is likely that many of these ￿rms would be unable to recover the ￿xed costs of
setting up their own distribution center. The remainder of the paper will use customs data
from China to verify the predictions of this model as well as generate previously unknown
facts regarding the activity of intermediary ￿rms.6
4Our model is in stark constrast to the predictions by Felbermayr and Jung (2009) that the share of
indirect exports is uncorrelated with any gravity-type variables. The di⁄erence occurs because our model
allows domestic intermediaries to operate in multiple countries while their model assumes destination-speci￿c
intermediaries. As a result, they ￿nd that both the indirect and direct export cuto⁄ covary with gravity
variables and o⁄sets any e⁄ect on the intermediary export share. As shown below, the data clearly show
that intermediary export shares covary with country characteristics, which is not consistent with Felbermayr
and Jung (2009).
5Blum et al. (2009) predict that an increase in market size has a non-linear impact of intermediary trade
and that higher trade costs will decrease the relative share of intermediaries in a three-country setting; our
theoretical and, as shown below, empirical ￿ndings are at odds with their predictions. Their model also
predicts that intermediary and direct exporters will export varieties at the same unit values, while in our
model, intermediaries export more expensive varieties because of the double marginalization and because
they export on behalf of relatively higher-cost manufactures.
6In unreported results (available upon request), we use a symmetric two-country model to analyze welfare.
We ￿nd that there is a tradeo⁄ between varieties and e¢ ciency. As the marginal cost of using intermediation
technology (￿) declines, there is a less e¢ cient allocation of resources because intermediation bene￿ts less-
productive ￿rms. However, this is counterweighed against the increase in welfare because of the additional
varieties that enter consumers￿consumption basket. In the special case of pareto distribution, the presence
of intermediaries results in larger welfare gains compared to a model without intermediaries. This implies
that the costs of relatively ine¢ cient resource allocation are outweighed by the bene￿ts of variety.Facilitating Trade 9
3. Data
Our data analysis uses Chinese data that record the census of ￿rm-level import and
export transactions across products and countries.7 Products are classi￿ed at the eight-digit
HS level. We observe values and quantities for each ￿rm-product-market transaction. The
data do not contain information about domestic production or characteristics of the ￿rms;
we therefore cannot assign a primary industry to identify if the ￿rm is a manufacturer or a
wholesaler, distributer and/or intermediary. We identify the set of intermediary ￿rms based
on Chinese characters that have the English-equivalent meaning of ￿importer￿ , ￿exporter￿ ,
and/or ￿trading￿in the ￿rm￿ s name.8 This assignment is of course imperfect. We likely
underestimate the importance of intermediaries in operating in China for two reasons. First,
intermediaries could have names that do not have these phrases in their names. Second,
the direct exporters may rely on foreign intermediary partners in their transactions who we
cannot observe.
One issue that complicates our analysis is that the Chinese government directly con-
trolled the set of ￿rms with direct trading rights prior to China￿ s entry into the WTO in
December 2001. The WTO mandated that China liberalize the scope and availability of
licenses so that within three years after accession, all enterprises would have the right to
import and export all goods. At the time of the WTO entry, only wholly Chinese-invested
￿rms with registered capital exceeding RMB 5 million could obtain direct trading rights.
In the second year after accession, the minimum capital requirement for direct trading was
RMB 3 million, and this fell to RMB 1 million by 2004. By 2005, any ￿rm that wished
to directly trade with foreign partners was free to do so. As a result of this complication,
our analysis uses a single cross-section of the data in 2005 when direct trading licenses had
been e⁄ectively removed.
4. Empirical Findings
4.1. Stylized Facts
We document a series of facts comparing the activity of intermediary and direct ex-
porting ￿rms. Table 1 reports the overall export values by ￿rm type from 2000 to 2005.
The ￿gures illustrate China￿ s phenomenal export growth during this period. Total exports
originating from China grew 211 percent. In 2005, intermediaries accounted for 22 percent
7Similar data has been used by Manova and Zhang (2009). One concern that inevitably arises with
Chinese data is its quality. We checked the aggregate import and export values against those reported in
the Comtrade data. The two datasets match remarkably well. Total exports in 2005 within the transactions
data are $771.53 billion compared to $761.95 billion in Comtrade and at the HS2 level, the databases report
similar values as well.
8Speci￿cally, we search for Chinese characters that mean ￿trading￿and ￿importer￿and ￿exporter￿ . In
pinyin (romanized Chinese), these phrases are: ￿jin4chu1kou3￿ , ￿jing1mao4￿ , ￿mao4yi4￿ , ￿ke1mao4￿and
￿wai4jing1￿ .Facilitating Trade 10
of total Chinese exports. Moreover, as discussed above, our identi￿cation of intermediaries
is likely to understate the importance of intermediaries. These ￿gures in the aggregate data
alone highlight the importance of intermediary ￿rms. We note that the table reports that
the share of intermediaries in exports fell between 2000 to 2005. This fall could re￿ ect the
liberalization of the export licensing regime or a fall in trade costs that enabled ￿rms to
switch towards direct exporting.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the total number of ￿rms that export. This table
also illustrates large increases in the number of globally engaged Chinese ￿rms during this
period. Total exporting ￿rms more than doubled from approximately 63,000 ￿rms in 2000
to 144,000 by 2005. Interestingly, the growth in the number of intermediary ￿rms over this
period exceeded the entry of direct exporters. This is suggestive evidence that despite the
liberalization of direct trading rights, intermediary ￿rms found it pro￿tably to enter the
market.
What types of products require intermediation? Figure 1 plots a histogram of the share of
intermediary exports across the 5,034 HS6 codes. The histogram shows that intermediaries
export virtually all products; thus, the overall numbers in Table 1 are not driven by certain
sectors. The average intermediary share is 32.8% and only 6 percent of the HS6, or 302
codes, report intermediary shares of less than 1%. The two-digit HS sectors with the
largest share of intermediary exports are: tobacco (HS 24, 99%), cereal (HS 10, 65%), ores
(HS 26, 64%), live animals (HS 1, 63%) and explosives (HS 36, 56%). The ￿ve smallest are
railway locomotives (HS 86, 3%), nickel (HS 75, 4%), nuclear reactors (HS 84, 9%) electrical
machinery (HS 85, 9%) and semi-precious stones (HS 71, 11%).
In Table 2, we correlate HS6 shares of intermediary exports with product characteristics
that capture variation in product di⁄erentiation. Column 1 reports the correlation with
the coe¢ cient of price variation. The result shows that products that are more homogenous
tend to have larger intermediary shares. The point estimates imply that increasing the
coe¢ cient of variation by one standard deviation lowers intermediary share by about 1.9
percentage points, or about 6 percent from the average share. In column 2, we report
the correlation with the quality ladders proposed by Khandelwal (forthcoming). While
the result is not statistically signi￿cant, the correlation is consistent with column 1. In
column 3, we observe a similar ￿nding using elasticities of substitution estimated by Broda
and Weinstein (2006). All three measures suggest that intermediaries are more likely to
handle relatively more homogenous or ￿commoditized￿ products. These results contrast
with Feenstra and Hanson (2004), who ￿nd that Hong Kong intermediaries￿re-exports of
Chinese products tend to be in more di⁄erentiated products.9
Another role for intermediaries, which is not discussed in the model, is to ￿nance the
9This con￿ icting ￿nding can be reconciled by product selection. The data indicate that relative to other
countries, intermediaries account for a relatively small fraction of exports to Hong Kong, and China￿ s exports
to Hong Kong are relatively concentrated in more di⁄erentiated products.Facilitating Trade 11
manufacturing ￿rms with whom they have contracts. If this activity is prevalent, we should
expect intermediaries to be relatively more important in products that require a high de-
gree of external ￿nancing. In column 4, we correlate intermediary export shares with the
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external ￿nance. We observe a negative relationship
which does not appear consistent with the ￿nancing role of intermediaries. If this mea-
sure of external ￿nance, however, also captures a degree of product di⁄erentiation (such as
capital and/or skill intensity), then the negative coe¢ cient is consistent with the previous
columns. Table 2 therefore suggests that intermediaries aggregate orders of relatively more
homogenous products.
Further insights on the activity of intermediary ￿rms can be learned from examining their
unit values vis-a-vis direct exporters. The model predicts that the exports by intermediaries
will be more expensive than direct exporters. This is because intermediation results in
double marginalization and because ￿rms with relatively higher unit costs endogenously
select to use the intermediation technology. We use the unit value information in the data
to provide some evidence that the data are consistent with these predictions. Table 3
compares unit values between ￿rm types. In this table, we regress (log) unit values on an
intermediary dummy and HS8 product-ownership pair ￿xed e⁄ects. We include ownership
type in the ￿xed e⁄ect because of evidence that foreign ￿rms charge higher prices relative to
domestic ￿rms (Wang and Wei, 2008). Consistent with the model, column 1 indicates that
exports by intermediaries are about 6.7 percent higher than direct exporters. In column 2,
we control for ￿rm size (proxied by total export revenue) using a ￿ exible quartic polynomial.
This lowers the relative di⁄erence in unit values to 5.1 percent. In column 3, we include
country-HS8-ownership ￿xed e⁄ects and the systematic di⁄erence remains. These results
are consistent with the model￿ s prediction. We note that this ￿nding also contrasts with the
predictions of the model in Blum et al. (2009) which does not imply double marginalization
because the costs of using intermediation technology are all ￿xed.
If unit values are a proxy for quality, our ￿ndings in Table 3 could also be consistent
with the quality-sorting role of intermediary ￿rms. For instance, Feenstra and Hanson
(2004) have shown that re-exports of Chinese products by Hong Kong intermediaries have
higher markups. In order to check against this alternative hypothesis, we interact the trader
dummy with product characteristics￿ the coe¢ cient of price variation, the quality ladder,
and the elasticities of substituion. If intermediaries mitigate adverse selection problems
by acting as gauranteers of quality, we might expect their relative prices to increase in
the scope for quality di⁄erentiation. However, as shown in columns 3-5, the interaction
coe¢ cient is not statistically di⁄erent from zero. That is, the relative price di⁄erence
between intermediary and direct exporters is statistically equivalent across products that
span a broad range of product heterogeneity. Together with ￿nding that intermediary
exports are relatively larger in more homogenous products, this table further suggests thatFacilitating Trade 12
quality sorting may not be the dominant role among Chinese intermediaries.
Direct and intermediary ￿rms di⁄er along several notable and important dimensions.
Intermediaries are more likely to engage in both importing and exporting relative to their
counterparts that directly trade (table not shown). Table 4 reports overall ￿rm-level sum-
mary statistics in 2005 in panel one, and statistics by ￿rm type in panels two and three.
As is well known in transactions data, a small number of exceptionally large ￿rms dom-
inate trade statistics, and so we also report median statistics. Panel two shows that the
median direct ￿rm exports 3 products to 3 destination markets. In contrast, the median
intermediary exports 11 products to 6 countries. In row 4, we classify HS codes into one of
15 unrelated sectors.10 The idea is to identify a ￿rm￿ s core activity (e.g., animal products,
wood products, textiles, etc.). Not surprisingly, the median direct ￿rm only exports prod-
ucts in one of these sectors. This is consistent with theoretical work in multiple-product ￿rm
models (e.g., Eckel and Neary (forthcoming), Nocke and Yeaple (2006), or Bernard, Red-
ding and Schott (2009)) who introduce core competencies in a model of multiple-product
￿rms. Intermediary ￿rms, however, handle products that span entirely unrelated sectors;
the median intermediary exports products in 4 sectors.
These statistics are broadly suggestive that intermediaries have a relative ￿country￿
focus; compared to direct ￿rms, they export more products per country. However, the ￿nal
row of Table 4 reports that the average intermediary is larger than its direct exporting
counterpart. It is perhaps not too surprising, then, that the summary statistics indicate
that traders export more products and to more destination markets. In order to verify if
trading ￿rms have a relative country focus, we control for ￿rm size. Column 1 of Table 5
report the average export varieties per country (column 1) by direct and intermediary ￿rms,
conditional on a quartic polynomial in ￿rm size.11 The table shows that intermediary ￿rms
average 10.5 varieties per country compared to direct ￿rms that export 8.3 varieties per
country. In column 2, we include additional controls for ownership types and the results
continue to hold￿ intermediary ￿rms export more varieties per country than direct ￿rms.
Again, these results are intuitive if manufacturing ￿rms possess a core competency in a
single line of business. In contrast, the model suggests that intermediaries arise to facilitate
products to destination markets.
An alternative way of understanding how the distribution of export sales over countries
and products di⁄er across ￿rm type is to consider the concentration of ￿rms￿export sales by
products. For each ￿rm, we compute its (normalized) her￿ndahl index by aggregating over
the country dimension. We can then compute the ￿rm￿ s share of exports in each product,
10HS 01-05 "Animal and Animal Products"; HS 06-15 "Vegetable Products"; HS 16-24 "Foodstu⁄s"; HS
25-27 "Mineral Products"; HS 28-38 "Plastics/Rubbers"; HS 41-43 "Raw Hides, Skins, Leathers & Furs";
HS 44-49 "Wood and Wood Products"; HS 50-63 "Textile"; HS 64-67 "Footwear/Headgear"; HS 68-71
"Stone/Glass"; HS 72-83 "Metals"; HS 84-85 "Machinery/Electrical"; HS 86-89 "Transportation"; HS 90-97
"Miscellaneous"; HS 98-99 "Service".
11The regression excludes the constant.Facilitating Trade 13
shf, as:
HIf =
PNf
h=1 s2
hf ￿ 1
Nf
1 ￿ 1
Nf
; (9)
where Nf is the number of products that the ￿rm exports. A higher HI implies that
a ￿rm￿ s exports are more concentrated among its product mix. In column 3 of Table 5,
we regress the HI measure on ￿rm type controlling for a quadratic polynomial in ￿rm
size. The table indicates that intermediaries have lower her￿ndahls implying that their
export sales are more evenly distributed across products compared to their direct exporting
counterparts. The 4th column includes ownership type dummies (state-owned enterprises,
private ￿rms, and foreign invested ￿rms) and the patterns hold. These results provide
evidence that direct exporters, relative to intermediaries, have a relative ￿country￿focus as
their ￿rm sales are more heavily skewed towards a concentrated number of products. Thus,
intermediaries appear to be relative ￿specialists￿of countries rather than products. In the
subsequent section, we examine the aggregate implication of the di⁄erences in the activities
of intermediaries and direct exporters.
4.2. Facilitating Trade
Figures 2 and 3 plot overall intermediary shares by destination market against the mar-
ket￿ s characteristics. Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between intermediary export
shares and the destination￿ s market 2005 GDP; exports to smaller markets are more likely
to be handled by intermediaries. In Figure 3, we average the share of intermediary exports
by the number of documents required by the country￿ s customs authorities (obtained from
the World Bank￿ s Doing Business Report). While admittedly crude, this variable, also used
by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), potentially captures the ￿xed costs of exporting
to a market. We see a strong positive relationship between intermediary export shares and
the ￿xed cost of exports. The relationship in both ￿gures are consistent with predictions
from the model.
In Table 6, we more formally examine the main predictions of the model: the share of
intermediary exports are increasing in the ￿xed and variable costs of exporting to markets.
We construct the share of intermediary exports in country-HS6 observations and correlate
the shares with gravity-type proxies for trade costs. We use the following regression model
sch = ￿ + X0
ch￿ + "ch (10)
where sch is the share of intermediary exports from China to country c in HS6 code h and
the X￿ s contain proxies for trade costs. In column 1, we regress country-HS6 intermediary
share of exports on the distance to the country and the country￿ s GDP. The coe¢ cient onFacilitating Trade 14
distance, a variable cost, is positive and the coe¢ cient on GDP, a measure of market size,
is negative. This is intuitive and accords with the model￿ s predictions. Countries that are
smaller and more distant rely relatively more on intermediaries for their imports from China.
The results imply that increasing distance to China by one log point increases intermediary
shares by 3.2 percentage points. Increasing market size by one log point results in a 2.2
percentage point decline in intermediary export shares. To get a sense of the magnitudes, the
average HS6-level intermediary share is about 30 percent; thus, increasing distance to China
raises intermediary shares to that country by about 10 percent. In column 2, we include the
fraction of ethnic Chinese population with the country and ￿nd that intermediaries export
relatively more to countries with fewer ethnic Chinese populations, although the coe¢ cient
is not signi￿cant at conventional levels.12 This ￿nding is also intuitive: Chinese ￿rms will
￿nd it easier to export directly to countries with larger Chinese populations. This ￿nding is
related to Rauch and Trindade (2004) who show that bilateral trade ￿ ows are larger among
countries with larger ethnic Chinese populations. Here, the results indicate that the share
of exports through intermediaries is smaller in these countries. Presumably trade costs,
which also encompass information barriers, are smaller between China and countries with
a large number Chinese emigrants.
In column 3, we include the proxy for the ￿xed costs. The coe¢ cient on this variable
is positive and statistically signi￿cant suggesting that more di¢ cult to export markets are
handled by relatively larger shares of intermediaries. The coe¢ cients on market size and
distance are also robust.
While our theoretical model provides an explanation for the endogenous entry of in-
termediary ￿rms, there may be other explainations for why intermediary ￿rms arise in
equilibrium. For instance, if trade credit is scarce, intermediaries may export on behalf of
￿nancially constrained ￿rms. However, the results in Table 6 include HS6 ￿xed e⁄ects and
therefore control for product-level heterogeneity, such as di⁄erences in ￿nancing require-
ments. Thus, our results suggest that market characteristics are salient determinants of
intermediary export shares.
In column 4, we add the country￿ s HS6-level MFN tari⁄ rates as an additional variable
cost proxy. According to the model, higher trade costs reduce the likelihood that less
productive ￿rms can cover the ￿xed costs of exporting and therefore will indirectly export
products. The correlation between intermediary shares and tari⁄s is positive indicating
that intermediaries are more important in country-product pairs with higher tari⁄s. The
magnitudes indicate that an 10 percentage point increase in tari⁄s (roughly one standard
deviation in our sample), holding other variables constant, would increase intermediary
shares by .59 percentage points.
12Shares of ethnic Chinese populations are obtained from Ohio University￿ s Shao Center Distribution of
the Ethnic Chinese Population Around the World.Facilitating Trade 15
We assess the sensitivity of the results through a series of robustness checks in Table 7.
In column 1, we include country ￿xed e⁄ects in the baseline regression. This speci￿cation is
therefore an extremely ￿ exible speci￿cation that controls for all country characteristic that
were previously excluded in the baseline regressions, such as rule of law, level of ￿nancial
development, etc. The regression identi￿es the coe¢ cient on tari⁄s using only cross-product
variation within a country. Consistent with the predictions from the model, the coe¢ cient
on tari⁄s remains positive and marginally signi￿cant (the p-value is 11%), although not
surprisingly, the magnitude attenuates.
Research on the nature of China￿ s trade with Hong Kong has revealed that a large
fraction of Hong Kong￿ s exports originate from China, and these Hong Kong exporters
are often intermediaries (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). Our classi￿cation of intermediary
trade to Hong Kong, in particular, may be imprecise. Moreoever, Fisman, Moustakerski
and Wei (2008) present evidence that Hong Kong intermediaries that re-export Chinese are
often used to evade tari⁄s, and that tari⁄ evasion increases with tari⁄ rates. Thus, we may
observe a correlation between tari⁄ rates and intermediary exports due to the incentive to
evade tari⁄s. For these reasons, we introduce a sensitivity check that drops all exports to
Hong Kong in column 2 of Table 7, and the results continue to hold.
In column 3, we remove export transactions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We
exclude SOEs because the objective function of these ￿rms may not be consistent with the
model￿ s assumptions. The magnitude on distance attenuates somewhat but the qualitative
estimate remains similar to the previous columns. The correlations with the other country
characteristics remain statistically signi￿cant and have the same sign as earlier.
In column 4, we remove shipments that are classi￿ed as processing and/or assembly
trade. We remove these transactions because the ￿xed and variable trade costs for these
shipments may di⁄er from ordinary exports. The coe¢ cients and patterns of signs remain
as before. The overall message of these tables is consistent with the prediction that inter-
mediaries facilitate exports to relatively ￿di¢ cult-to-access￿markets.
Finally, in Table 8, we compare the sensitivity of exports to country characteristics
between intermediaries and direct exporters. We regress the (log) HS6-country export
value on a HS6 ￿xed e⁄ect and interact country characteristics with a dummy for exports
by intermediaries. The results indicate that exports by intermediaries are less sensitive to
country characteristics, such as distance and market size, than exports by direct exporters.
For instance, a one log point increase in distance implies a 26 percent decline in exports by
direct exporters, compared to just a 14 percent decline of intermediary exports. Likewise,
increasing market size by one log point increases direct exports by 34 percent compared
to just 27 percent for intermediaries. We observe a similar di⁄erence with ethnic chinese
population, but not the measure of ￿xed costs. These results are similar to Bernard et al.
(2009) who also ￿nd that exports by U.S. wholesale ￿rms are less sensitive to market sizeFacilitating Trade 16
and distance relative to manufacturing ￿rms. And consistent with earlier results, as well as
the predictions of the model, the evidence here further suggests that intermediaries play an
important role in faciliating trade by overcoming trade costs.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents the ￿rst evidence of the role of intermediary ￿rms in facilitating trade
across the entire universe of of exporting ￿rms in China. We ￿nd that non-manufacturing
trading ￿rms mediate a substantial fraction of ￿rm trade. In 2005, they accounted for 22%
of China￿ s aggregate exports, or $171 million. The activity of intermediaries behave in
systematically di⁄erent ways than their direct exporting counterparts. They export a wide
variety of products that tend to be relatively more homogenous than those exported by
direct expoters. Intermediaries appear to adopt a relative country focus by having exports
concentrated relatively within countries than within products. The aggregate implications
of this di⁄erence in activity is that intermediaries are more likely to export to markets that
have higher trade costs and are smaller. This ￿nding is consistent with intermediaries being
used by relatively smaller ￿rms who ￿nd it di¢ cult to enter the export market on their
own.
This paper demonstrates that further research on intermediary exporting and importing
￿rms is warranted for several reasons.13 First, the recent literature on ￿rm heterogeneity
within international trade has largely ignored the role of intermediaries. Our framework
predicts that small ￿rms endogenously choose to export via intermediaries; this implies that
small ￿rms can, and do, access foreign markets even though they are unable to cover the
￿xed costs of direct exporting. One implication is that ￿rms can bene￿t from importing
products even if they do not directly import products. The presence of intermediaries
implies that analyzing ￿rm-level imports may understate the bene￿ts from importing that
arise at the sector-level because of intermediaries (see Goldberg et al. 2009). It could also
explain why countries enact policies to encourage the formation of intermediaries.
Intermediaries could therefore serve as vehicles for small ￿rms to learn their potential in
foreign markets, either by learning about their own productivity, or about foreign demand.
In subsequent periods, this may enable them to select directly in to the export market.
Thus, the matching of ￿rms to intermediaries may be important for understanding the
growth of the extensive margin of trade, as well as uncovering new channels (e.g., learning)
through which the gains from trade are distributed within an economy.
13A separate but related line of recent research has focused on the distribution of the gains from trade in
the presence of intermediaries (Bardhan et al. (2009) and Antras and Costinot (2009)).Facilitating Trade 17
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Year
Total Value
($ million)
Direct Export
Value
Intermediary
Export Value
Intermediary
Value Share
(1) (2) (3) (9)
2000 249,234 163,047 86,187 35%
2001 290,606 198,003 92,603 32%
2002 325,632 230,740 94,892 29%
2003 438,473 323,541 114,931 26%
2004 593,647 450,813 142,835 24%
2005 776,739 608,926 167,813 22%
Total Firms
Direct Exporting
Firms
Intermediary
Firms
Intermediary
Firm Share
2000 62,768 53,759 9,009 14%
2001 68,487 58,672 9,815 14%
2002 78,612 67,750 10,862 14%
2003 95,688 81,724 13,964 15%
2004 120,590 100,172 20,418 17%
2005 144,027 121,928 22,099 15%
Export Values and Firms
Notes: Table reports summary statistics from China's export
transactions data. The values in the top panel are in millions of U.S.
dollars. The bottom panel reports counts of the number of exporting
firms. See text for definition of intermediary firms. Source: Authors'
calculations from the China's transactions data.
Table 1: Total Export Values and Firms, 2000-2005Facilitating Trade 21
(1) (2) (3) (4)
{Coefficient of Price Variation} h -0.010 ***
0.002
{Quality Ladder}h -0.004
0.005
{BW Elasticity of Substitution} h 0.005
0.006
{External dependence}h -0.089 ***
0.028
Observations 4,958 3,261 5,033 3,956
Intermediary Share of Exports and Product Characteristics
Notes: The depedent variable in each regression in the share of intermediary exports. The
covariate in column 1 is the coefficient of price variation. Column 2 reports the coefficient
on the HS6-level quality ladder taken from Khandelwal (forthcoming); the loss of
observations in column 2 is due to the fact that the quality ladder is not available for all HS6
codes. Column 3 uses the elasticity of substitution measured from Broda and Weinstein
(2006). Column 4 uses the measure for external finance from Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit HS level in column 3 and at the ISIC level in
column 4 since these are the respective levels of variation in each column, respectively.
Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 2: Intermediary Share of Exports and Product Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
{Intermediary}f 0.067 *** 0.051 *** 0.023 *** 0.030 *** 0.021 ** 0.014
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.033
{Intermediary}f X {CV}h -0.002
0.002
{Intermediary}f X {Ladder}h 0.000
0.006
{Intermediary}f X {Elasticity}h 0.003
0.010
Quartic Firm-size controls no yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effectrs po po cpo cpo cpo cpo
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82
Observations 4,594,598 4,594,598 4,594,598 4,594,598 3,697,495 4,583,207
Unit Value Differentials
Notes: Table regresses firms' (f) log unit values (at the country-product level) on intermediary dummy and controls
in 2005. Row 2 interacts an intermediary dummy with the coefficient of variation of unit values. Row 3 includes the
interactions with the quality ladder taken from Khandelwal (forthcoming). Row 4 uses the elasticity of substitution
from Broda and Weinstein (2006). The symbols for the pair fixed effects are product (p), ownership (o) and country
(c). Standard errors are clustered by product. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 3: Unit Value Di⁄erentialsFacilitating Trade 22
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firms
Products 15.9 4 10.6 3 45.3 11
Countries 8.0 3 6.9 3 14.3 6
Sectors
a 2.55 1 2.11 1 4.98 4
Total Export Value ($) 5,393,010 572,964 4,994,145 519,890 7,593,688 994,082
144,027 121,928 22,099
Firm-Level Summary Statistics
All Firms Direct Firms Intermediary Firms
Export Data
Notes:  Table reports export statistics for 2005.
aSectors are classified as follows: HS 01-05
"Animal and Animal Products"; HS 06-15 "Vegetable Products"; HS 16-24 "Foodstuffs"; HS 25-
27 "Mineral Products"; HS 28-38 "Plastics/Rubbers"; HS 41-43 "Raw Hides, Skins, Leathers &
Furs"; HS 44-49 "Wood and Wood Products"; HS 50-63 "Textile"; HS 64-67
"Footwear/Headgear"; HS 68-71 "Stone/Glass"; HS 72-83 "Metals"; HS 84-85
"Machinery/Electrical"; HS 86-89 "Transportation"; HS 90-97 "Miscellaneous"; HS 98-99
"Service". Source: Authors' calculations from Chinese transactions data.
(1) (2) (3)
Table 4: Firm-Level Summary Statistics for Exporting Firms, 2005
Firm Type
Varieties
per Country
Varieties
per Country
Product
Herfindahl
Product
Herfindahl
Direct Firms 8.34 10.03 0.48 0.44
Intermediary Firms 10.56 11.98 0.28 0.27
Quartic Firm-size controls yes yes yes yes
Ownership FEs no yes no yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.73 0.73
Observations 144,027 144,027 144,027 144,027
Margins, by Firm Type
Notes: Column 1 regresses the firm-level products per country on firm type and a
quartic polynomial of firm-size controls. Column 2 includes ownership dummies. The
dependent variable in Column 3 and 4 regress firm's herfindahl index computed
over products (equation 9). All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1
percent level and so standard errors have been supressed.
Table 5: Margins, by Firm TypeFacilitating Trade 23
(1) (2) (3) (4)
{Log Distance}c 0.032 *** 0.026 *** 0.028 *** 0.025 ***
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008
{Log GDP}c -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.019 ***
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
{Log Chinese Population}c -0.002 * -0.003 * -0.004 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001
{# of Importing Procs}c 0.003 ** 0.003 ***
0.001 0.001
{MFN Tariff}hc 0.059 **
0.022
HS6 FEs yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
Observations 267,201 221,373 207,594 185,975
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the share of intermediary exports of
total country-HS6 exports. Column 1 includes distance and market size as covariates.
Column 2 adds the share of ethnic Chinese population, taken from Ohio University Shao
Center's Distribution of the Ethnic Chinese Population Around the World. Column 3
includes the World Bank's Doing Business Report measure of the number of procedures
required for importing a container. Column 4 includes the country's HS6 MFN tariff on
Chinese products, obtained from WITS. All standard errors clustered at the country level.
Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
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Table 6: Intermediary Shares and Country CharacteristicsFacilitating Trade 24
(1) (2) (3) (4)
{Log Distance}c 0.020 *** 0.012 0.022 ***
0.008 0.009 0.007
{Log GDP}c -0.020 *** -0.024 *** -0.016 ***
0.003 0.003 0.002
{Log Chinese Population}c -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 **
0.001 0.001 0.001
{# of Importing Procs}c 0.003 *** 0.004 ** 0.003 **
0.001 0.002 0.001
{MFN Tariff}hc 0.024 0.046 ** 0.078 *** 0.038 *
0.015 0.019 0.023 0.021
HS6 FEs yes yes yes yes
Country FEs yes no no no
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13
Observations 223,282 181,612 163,044 181,793
Intermediary Export Share and Country Characteristics
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the share of intermediary exports of total
country-HS6 exports. Column 2 excludes exports to Hong Kong. Column 3 excludes exports by
state-owned enterprises and re-computes intermediary shares of country-HS6 exports.
Column 4 removes all exports classified under processing and assembly trade and re-
computes intermediary shares of country-HS6 exports. All standard errors clustered at the
country level. Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 7: Robustness ChecksFacilitating Trade 25
(1) (2) (3)
{Log Distance}c -0.261 *** -0.271 *** -0.282 ***
0.063 0.043 0.041
X Intermediary 0.117 *** 0.107 *** 0.116 ***
0.028 0.037 0.035
{Log GDP}c 0.341 *** 0.314 *** 0.324 ***
0.015 0.016 0.018
X Intermediary -0.068 *** -0.045 *** -0.047 ***
0.007 0.010 0.011
{Log Chinese Population}c 0.030 *** 0.030 ***
0.008 0.008
X Intermediary -0.021 *** -0.020 ***
0.005 0.005
{# of Importing Procs}c 0.005
0.010
X Intermediary 0.009 *
0.005
HS6 FEs yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.32
Observations 425,396 357,902 338,956
Sensitivity to Gravity, Intermediaries vs. Direct Exporters
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is total country-HS6 export value
for intermediaries and direct exporters. Column 1 includes distance and market size
as covariates. Column 2 adds the share of ethnic Chinese population. Column 3
includes the measure of the number of procedures required for importing a
container. Column 4 includes the country's HS6 MFN tariff on Chinese productsEach
covariate is interacted with a dummy for trade by intermediaries (the coefficient on
intermediaries is supressed). All standard errors clustered at the country level.
Significance: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 8: Sensitivity to Gravity, Intermediaries vs Direct ExportersFacilitating Trade 26
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Figure 1: Distribution of Intermediary Export Shares, HS6 level
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Figure 2: Intermediary export share and market sizeFacilitating Trade 27
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Figure 3: Average intermediary export share by number of documents required for importing